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REAP WHAT YOU SOW: SOIL POLLUTION
REMEDIATION REFORM IN CHINA
Dustin D. Drenguis †
Abstract: As China undergoes the fastest economic development in the history of
the world, so too has its environmental problems shattered all precedents. While China’s
leaders recognize they must change course, environmental concerns have long taken a
back seat to economic development. Soil pollution is destroying China’s environment,
affecting public health, and reducing the country’s food supply. Soil pollution slows
China’s economic development, preventing land development in urban centers. Soil
pollution also threatens China’s social stability because it has inspired marginalized
groups to organize in protest of environmental conditions. Environmental remediation,
or the obligations of a facility or the government to clean up land contaminates, is
essential in China. But China’s environmental remediation laws are ambiguous, poorly
enforced, and often entirely unobserved. In order to respond to these challenges, the
central government needs to develop a remediation scheme that: 1) requires strict liability
to remediate soil pollution with appropriate exceptions; 2) evaluates the degree of
remediation needed for a particular site; 3) utilizes the cadre system’s promotion targets
to ensure enforcement; and 4) promotes more public transparency to relieve the public’s
anxiety. These changes will serve both environmental and economic interests.

I.

INTRODUCTION

When the Rongping factory opened in 1994 in the town of Xiping,
Fujian Province, it seemed like an economic savior. The chemical plant
doubled the town’s population and quickly accounted for one-third of the
county’s tax base. 1 But after the factory opened, villagers noticed dying
bamboo groves, fewer fish in the river, and a strange smell from the green
slime in the river.2 Illness and cancer rates grew.3 Zhang Changjian, a local
“barefoot doctor”4 in Xiping, noticed these changes and began to petition the
government in 1999 for soil remediation, arguing that the factory or
government were obligated to clean up soil contaminates. 5 A high
†
Juris Doctor expected 2014, University of Washington School of Law. The author would like to
thank Professor Dongsheng Zang for his assistance in developing this comment. Any errors or omissions
are the author’s own.
1
Shai Oster, In Booming China, A Doctor Battles A Polluting Factory; Fouled Waters Lead to
Flood of Protests Nationwide; Officials’ Mixed Messages; Inspired by Erin Brockovich, 248 WALL ST. J. E.
EDITION A1 (July 19, 2006), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB115325157476810126.html.
2
Id.
3
Duan Hongqing, Thirteenth year not the end in Village’s Fight Against Pollution, CAIJING
MAGAZINE Sept. 2005 (China) available at http://english.caijing.com.cn/2005-09-05/100043252.html.
4
Barefoot doctors are individuals who have received basic medical education, usually training at a
county hospital for three to six months, and work in rural areas of China. See Daqing Zhang & Paul
Unschuld, China’s Barefoot Doctors: Past, Present, and Future, 372 THE LANCET 1865 (2008).
5
Oster, supra note 1.
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concentration of chromium, a known human carcinogen, 6 was found in
Xingping’s soil and water.7 After years of unanswered letters, in 2001 Dr.
Zhang was instructed by China’s top environmental agency to organize a
formal complaint. 8 Eventually 1,721 villagers joined the lawsuit. 9 The
county government shut down Dr. Zhang’s clinic. 10 The doctor claimed
thugs assaulted him and his wife as a consequence of their efforts.11 Despite
these obstacles, the Xiping villagers’ case is one of China’s rare
environmental success stories. 12 The court awarded the plaintiffs
USD 85,000, with the average plaintiff getting about USD 50.13
For years, China has prioritized rapid economic growth over all other
concerns, 14 but recent government rhetoric has favored stronger
environmental protection. China elevated the position of environment and
energy in the country’s Eleventh Five-Year Plan, establishing high-priority
national targets for energy intensity and pollution reduction.15 The plan also
included supporting policies and funding mechanisms.16 The policies and
funding have added more teeth to the environmental rhetoric. A few
environmental targets were given the highest-level priorities. According to
Professor Kan, “the Chinese government invested USD 1.6 billion annually,
0.51% of China’s GDP, on environmental protection; in 2008, the number
increased to USD 66 billion, reaching 1.49% of China’s GDP.”17 In 2008,
the State Environmental Protection Administration (“SEPA”) was elevated to
the ministry level position 18 and renamed the Ministry of Environmental
6
AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY, TOXFAQS FOR CHROMIUM (Oct. 2012),
http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxfaqs/tf.asp?id=61&tid=17.
7
Duan Hongqing, supra note 3.
8
Oster, supra note 1.
9
Id.
10
Id
11
Id.
12
Alex Wang, The Role of Law in Environmental Protection in China: Recent Developments, 8 VT.
J. ENVTL. L. 196, 214 (2007). The Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims (“CLAPV”) assisted
Mr. Zhang and the villagers in the case. Id. at 213. Later, Professor Wang notes that the courts application
of the correct legal doctrine could in part be attributed to the experience of the litigators. Id. at 219.
13
Oster, supra note 1.
14
Over the past three decades, China’s GDP has grown by 9% annually. No country has moved up
the economic ladder as quickly as China. PHILLIP STALLEY, FOREIGN FIRMS, INVESTMENT, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1 (2010).
15
Alex L. Wang, China’s Environmental Tipping Point, in CHINA IN AND BEYOND THE HEADLINES
112, 114 (Timothy B. Weston & Lionel M. Jensen eds., 2012). Note: the Eleventh Five-Year Plan was
promulgated in 2006 and ran until 2010. These five-year plans are a series of social and economic
development initiatives.
16
Id.
17
See Haidong Kan, Environment and Health in China: Challenges and Opportunities, 117 ENVTL.
HEALTH PERSP. 530 (Dec. 2009), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2799473/.
18
China Upgrades Environmental Administration to Ministry, XINHUA NEWS (China) (Mar. 11,
2008, 4:19 PM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-03/11/content_7766369.htm.
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Protection (“MEP”).19 With the elevation, the MEP enjoys a greater voice in
decision-making and is less subject to opposing interests.20
While China has begun to acknowledge environmental concerns, there
is still much room for improvement. China’s ambitions to develop its
economy have not slowed; it aims to quadruple its 2000 GDP by the year
2020.21 As recently as 2010, the minister of the MEP publicly stated that
China’s current environmental situation could be summarized as “partly
improved but remains uncontrolled as a whole, with increasing pressures.”22
In 2005, Xie Zhenhua, the minister of the MEP, was forced to resign due to
the Jilin chemical plant incident.23 Explosions at the plant killed six, lead to
the evacuation of thousands, and created an eighty kilometer toxic slick of
benzene24 and nitrobenzene25 in the Songhua River.26 Although neither Mr.
Xie nor the MEP were involved with the cover-up, his removal indicates that
the central government may hold officials accountable for environmental
disasters on their watch.27 However, a year after his resignation, Mr. Xie
was appointed vice minister of the more powerful National Development
and Reform Commission (“NDRC”) 28—arguably a promotion.
Although Dr. Zhang and the Xiping villagers’ success marks an
improvement in legal accountability in Chinese environmental policy, their
19
ELIZABETH C. ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK: THE ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGE TO
CHINA’S FUTURE 111 (2d. ed. 2010).
20
Id. For a recent example of the MEP throwing its weight around, see Eric Ng & Li Jing, Oil
Giants Barred from new Projects After Missing Pollution Targets, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Aug. 30,
2013, 5:02 AM), http://www.scmp.com/business/companies/article/1300306/china-environment-ministrysuspends-some-approvals-sinopec-cnpc.
21
Haidong Kan, supra note 17.
22
Wu Jingjing, The Environment has been Partly Improved but Remains Uncontrolled as a Whole:
Zhou Shengxian Talked About Exploring a new way for Environmental Protection, XINHUA DAILY
TELEGRAPH (China) (Nov. 27, 2010, 11:20 AM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/mrdx/201011/27/c_13624608.htm. See also WANG JIN & HOUFU YAN, BARRIERS AND SOLUTIONS TO BETTER
ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT IN CHINA 495 (Int’l Network for Envtl. Compliance and Enforcement ed.,
2011), http://inece.org/conference/9/proceedings/56_WangYan.pdf (quoting Minister Zhenhua’s
statements).
23
See Shai Oster, China’s Climate Negotiator Has Toxic History, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 17, 2009),
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2009/12/17/china%E2%80%99s-climate-negotiator-has-toxic-history/.
24
Benzene is a known human carcinogen. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV.,
NATIONAL TOXICOLOGY PROGRAM, REPORT ON CARCINOGENS, BENZENE 60 (2011).
25
At low nitrobenzene concentrations, symptoms include fatigue, weakness, dyspnea, headache, and
dizziness. At higher concentrations, depressed respiration, bluish-gray skin, disturbed vision, and coma
may occur. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, HAZARD SUMMARY: NITROBENZENE (Jan. 2000), available at
http://www.epa.gov/ttnatw01/hlthef/nitroben.html.
26
China Pledges to Minimize Impact of River Pollution on Russia, XINHUA (China) (Nov. 24, 2005),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-11/24/content_3831641.htm.
27
See Wu Jiao, Recycling Officials, is it Right? CHINA DAILY (Jan. 10, 2007),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-01/10/content_779115.htm.
28
CHARLES R. MCELWEE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN CHINA: MITIGATING RISK AND ENSURING
COMPLIANCE 83 n.18 (2011).
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proceedings also demonstrate its failures. Today, the soil around the
chemical plant remains untreated and polluted.29 The bamboo crops are still
damaged and villagers say there is no market for their produce because
people fear the food is tainted. 30 The land is still poisoned from the
Rongping factory pollutants.31
This comment focuses on a neglected aspect of China’s environmental
law: soil remediation. Remediation requirements obligate entities to treat
polluted soil. 32 Part II describes the effects of soil pollution and the
problems it presents to China. Soil pollution threatens China’s environment,
economic development, and social stability. Part III argues that China’s
current legal framework for soil pollution is faulty. The current laws are
ambiguous, poorly enforced by local officials, and often entirely
unobserved. Chinese tort and criminal laws may theoretically provide an
alternative solution to regulation, but they too are ineffective. Finally,
Part IV proposes that in order to respond to these challenges, the central
government needs to develop a remediation scheme that: 1) imposes strict
liability to remediate soil pollution; 2) evaluates the degree of remediation
needed for a particular site; 3) utilizes the cadre system’s promotion targets
to ensure enforcement; and 4) promotes more public transparency to relieve
the public’s anxiety.
CHINA’S SOIL REMEDIATION POLICY IS ESSENTIAL TO THE
ENVIRONMENT, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND SOCIAL HARMONY

II.

Before getting into the weeds of environmental remediation law, it is
important to understand why soil pollution and remediation is crucial in
China. Soil pollution threatens China’s public health through direct
exposure and contamination of the country’s food supply. Economic
development has been constrained because many contaminated sites are in
urban centers and the land cannot be re-developed. Soil pollution also
disrupts China’s social stability. As a result, marginalized groups have
started to organize in protest of environmental conditions. The combination
of these three problems makes soil pollution an issue the Chinese
government should take seriously.

29

Oster, supra note 1.
Id.
31
Id.
32
See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DIRECTIVE NO. 9200.4-25, SOIL CLEANUP CRITERIA IN 40
CFR PART 192 (1998), http://www.epa.gov/superfund/health /conmedia/soil/cleanup.htm.
30
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Soil Pollution Threatens China’s Public Health Through Direct
Exposure and Contamination of China’s Crops

The central government has not disclosed the exact degree of
pollution in China’s soil, 33 but all signs indicate a critical problem. The
government commissioned a six-year soil survey involving 30,000 people,
but the academics leading the project were forbidden from releasing
preliminary findings.34 Meanwhile, over one million tons of untreated toxic
waste has accumulated across China. 35 In 2005, government officials
demanded the safe disposal of four million tons of chromium stockpiled in
nineteen provinces.36 The NDRC reported that most of the waste was not
properly disposed and instead was discharged directly into the
environment.37
Once in the soil, soil pollution can contaminate land for centuries.38
Polluted soil can be transmitted directly into the human body through soil
ingestion, contaminated water pathways, or dermal contact. 39 All
individuals in contact with polluted soil ingest at least small quantities of
soil because soil adheres to hands and unwashed food.40 Small children are
particularly susceptible because of their tendency to consume soil directly.41
Soil pollutants can affect water quality from surface runoff and erosion.42
Approximately 78% of streams that run through urban areas are unsafe for

33
Jonathan Watts, The Clean-up Begins on China’s Dirty Secret—Soil Pollution, THE GUARDIAN
(June 12, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/jun/12/china-soil-pollution-bonn-challenge.
When Beijing lawyer Dong Zhengwei requested data from the 2006 survey, he was informed the survey is
a state secret. Christina Larson, Soil Pollution is a State Secret in China. BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK
(Feb. 25, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-02-25/soil-pollution-is-a-state-secret-in-china.
34
Watts, supra note 33.
35
Zhou Wenting, Huge Stockpiles of Toxic Waste in 12 Provinces, CHINA DAILY (Aug. 31, 2011),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2011-08/31/content_13224360.htm .
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
See Bao Xiaodong & Zhang Xinyuan, Building on Toxic Land, SOUTHERN WEEKEND (China),
(Dec. 1, 2012), translated in CHINADIALOGUE.NET,
http://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/4726. Similarly, heavy metals do not decompose like
organic pollutants. See Chen Huamian et al., Heavy Metal Pollution in Soils in China: Status and
Countermeasures, 28 ROYAL SWEDISH ACAD. OF SCI. 130, 132 (1999).
39
John Hawley, Assessment of Health Risk from Exposure to Contaminated Soil, 5 RISK ANALYSIS 4,
289 (1985).
40
P.W. Abrahams, Soils, Their Implications to Human Health, 291 SCI. OF THE TOTAL ENV’T. 1, 2
(2002).
41
See Sue Binder & David Sokal, Estimating Soil Indigestion: the Use of Tracer Elements in
Estimating the Amount of Soil Ingested by Young Children, 41 ARCHIVES OF ENVTL. HEATH 341 (1986).
42
See Susanna T.Y. Tong & Wenli Chen, Modeling the Relationship Between Land Use and
Surface Water Quality, 66 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 377 (2002).
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drinking 43 and over 500 million Chinese do not have access to potable
water.44 Pollutants can also be transferred directly through contact with the
skin. For example, in nineteen U.S. Superfund sites, dermal pathway was
considered to be the biggest carcinogenic risk associated with soil
contamination.45
Soil pollution threatens China’s food safety.46 Zhou Jianmin, director
of the China Soil Association, estimated that one-tenth of China's farmland
is affected by soil pollution.47 Heavy metals in soil adversely affect plant
growth. 48 Moreover, plants may absorb contaminates and become
contaminated as well. About 16% of China’s 120 million hectares of
farmland suffer from pollution and 10 million acres are affected by industrial
pollution.49 Studies from 2002 and 2007 indicate that 10% of rice grown in
China is contaminated by cadmium, a heavy metal that affects liver function
and bone health. 50 Many Chinese simply cannot afford to buy noncontaminated rice,51 while others remain ignorant of the problem.52
Once soil pollutants enter the human body, either through direct
exposure or food contamination, they may accumulate.
Pollutants
accumulate in the body because many are not biodegradable. 53 This
accumulation results in severe health effects.
Chinese industry is one source of soil pollution. Smelters and battery
factories in China release lead into the environment.54 Lead is a neurotoxin
43

Jie Chen, Rapid Urbanization in China: a real Challenge to Soil Protection and Food Security, 69
CATENA 1, 9 (2007).
44
China to Supply Safe Drinking Water for 160 Million Rural People in Five Years, PEOPLE’S DAILY
ONLINE (Aug. 31, 2006), http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200608/31/eng20060831_298275.html.
45
Abrahams, supra note 40, at 11.
46
For example, researchers found high levels of arsenic in the rice plants and vegetables growing
near mining and smelting industries. The people in the city had elevated levels of arsenic in their hair
samples. See Xiao-Yong Liao et al., Soil as Contamination and its Risk Assessment in Areas near the
Industrial Districts of Chenzhou City, Southern China, 31 ENV’T INT’L 791, 791-92 (2005).
47
Watts, supra note 33.
48
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, MY CHILDREN HAVE BEEN POISONED: A PUBLIC HEALTH CRISIS IN FOUR
CHINESE PROVINCES 14 (2011).
49
Pollutants, Pesticides Threaten Farmland, CHINA DAILY (June 12, 2012),
http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2012-06/12/content_15496596.htm.
50
Gong Jing, Heavy Metals Tainting China’s Rice Bowls, CAIXING ONLINE (Feb. 14, 2011),
http://english.caixin.com/2011-02-13/100224762.html.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Tao Chen et al., Identification of Trace Element Sources and Associated Risk Assessment in
Vegetable Soils of the Urban-Rural Transitional Area of Hangzhou, China, 151 ENVTL. POLLUTION 67
(2008).
54
China’s battery industry, one of the main culprits of lead contamination, has grown 20% every
year from 2007 to 2011. See Sharon LaFraniere, Lead Poisoning in China: The Hidden Scourge, N.Y.
TIMES (June 15, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/15/world/asia/15lead.html?pagewanted=all. In
2009, 600 children were found to have lead poisoning in a single incident in Shaanxi Province. Two weeks
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that is especially harmful to children’s behavioral and cognitive
development.55 Mercury is harmful as well: Chinese workers engaged in
mercury smelting demonstrate bleeding gums, shaking hands, and twitching
eyes, while cattle in the same region have shorter lifespans and develop bone
deformation.56 Cheap Chinese “brick” tea contains high levels of fluoride,
which contributes to dental and skeletal fluorosis.57 Rice in southern China
has been contaminated with cadmium.58 Cadmium has polluted the soil in
some Chinese villages since before the 1960s.59
Farmers themselves are also a source of soil pollution. A study from
Renmin University found that farmers used 40% more fertilizer than crops
needed, causing about 10 million tons of fertilizer to be discharged into the
environment every year. 60 Excess fertilizer washes into waterways and
results in eutrophication, a phenomenon that occurs when too many nutrients
cause excessive plant growth and starve fish of oxygen.61 Nitrogen from
fertilizers can also cause methemoglobinemia in infants, a blood disorder
that can result in brain damage or death.62
While China must address contamination in the soil due to past
practices, environmental accidents continue to make the situation worse. In
2012, twenty tons of cadmium were discharged into the Longjiang river,
later in an unrelated incident, 1,300 children in Hunan Province were reported to have lead poisoning.
Johnathan Watts, 1,300 Children get Lead Poisoning from Year-Old Factory in China, THE GUARDIAN
(Aug. 20, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/aug/20/china-children-mass-lead-poisoning.
55
See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, PREVENTING LEAD EXPOSURE IN YOUNG
CHILDREN: A HOUSING BASED APPROACH TO PRIMARY PREVENTION OF LEAD POISONING 8 (Oct. 2004),
available at http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/lead/publications/PrimaryPreventionDocument.pdf.
56
Chen Huamian, supra note 38, at 132.
57
See J. Cao, et. al., Fluorosis Induced by Drinking Brick Tea, 29 FLUORIDE 139, 139-42 (1996).
58
See Cui Yuijing, et al., Exposures to Metal Mixtures and Human Health Impacts in a
Contaminated Area in Nanjing, China, 31 ENVTL. INT’L 784 (2005).
59
Gong Jing, supra note 50. See also Liang Chen, A Poisoned River, GLOBAL TIMES (China) (May
24, 2011), http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/658614.shtml (describing cadmium pollution in the
Xiangjiang River). Villagers often have no choice but to eat the contaminated rice they cultivate. A
woman from Xinma village in Human Province described the situation: “[p]eople with money can avoid
the bad rice, but the rest of us just have to live with it.” Jing Gong, China’s Tainted Rice Trail (2),
CENTURY WKLY (China) (Apr. 1, 2011), translated in CHINADIALOGUE.NET,
https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/4198-China-s-tainted-rice-trail-2-.
60
Niu Shuping, China Needs to Cut Use of Fertilizers Says Research, REUTERS (Jan. 14. 2010),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/14/us-china-agriculture-fertiliser-idUSTRE60D20T20100114. See
also Yuxuan Li et al., An Analysis of China’s Fertilizer Policies: Impacts on the Industry, Food Security,
and the Environment, 42 J. OF ENVTL. QUALITY 972, 972-81 (2013) (explaining the potential environmental
consequences of fertilizer use in China).
61
Yang Meng, The Damaging Truth About Chinese Fertiliser and Pesticide Use, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK. CHINESE EDITION (Jul. 9, 2012), translated in CHINADIALOGUE.NET,
https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/5153.
62
See J.R. SELF & R.M. WASKOM, NITRATES IN DRINKING WATER (Colo. St. U. Extension ed., Oct.
2008) http://www.ext.colostate.edu/pubs/crops/00517.html.
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affecting the water supply of 3.7 million people.63 A chemical spill at a
fertilizer factory in Changzhi discharged thirty-nine tons of aniline, a
potential carcinogen, but local officials delayed reporting the accident for
five days.64 China’s soil pollution problem is endangering public health. It
is a problem that must be addressed.
B.

Soil Pollution is Damaging China’s Economy by Slowing Urban
Development and Threatening Food Security

Due to China’s economic development policy of “pollute first, control
later” (“xian wuran hou zhili”),65 the collateral damage to the environment
from development has started to adversely affect its economy.66 The total
cost of controlling air and water pollution is 5.78% of China’s GDP.67 A
2005 study estimates that pollution expenses associated with lost labor and
health care cost the Chinese economy USD 112 billion annually. 68
Specifically, soil pollution is slowing urban development and threatening
China’s domestic food supply.
Soil pollution is particularly damaging to economic development in
urban areas. Many former industrial sites in cities have been abandoned
because of contamination concerns.69 Rural Chinese are migrating to cities
at unprecedented rates. 70 As migration has occurred, city centers have
expanded.71 Factories formerly on the city’s edge are now in the middle of
63
David Eimer, 20 Tons of Cadmium Poisoning Vital Chinese River, THE TELEGRAPH (Feb. 2, 2012),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/environment/9053671/20-tons-of-cadmium-poisoning-vital-Chineseriver.html.
64
Edward Wong, Spill in China Underlines Environmental Concerns, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/03/world/asia/spill-in-china-lays-bare-environmentalconcerns.html?pagewanted=all.
65
Wang, supra note 12, at 198.
66
The idea that China’s inadequate environmental protection could impede future growth goes back
to at least 1997. See Mark Hertsgarrd, Our Real China Problem, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY (Nov. 1997),
http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/issues/97nov/china.htm.
67
WORLD BANK, COST OF POLLUTION IN CHINA: ECONOMIC ESTIMATES OF PHYSICAL DAMAGE
(2007). Another study using different metrics found the rate to be lower, at 2.68% of GDP. Id.
68
MIT JOINT PROGRAM ON THE SCIENCE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL CHANGE, HEALTH DAMAGES FROM
AIR POLLUTION IN CHINA (2011).
69
Zhang Xiang, Clean up Toxic Brownfields Before China can go Green, SHANGHAI DAILY (Jan. 22,
2011), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/indepth/2011-01/22/c_13702537.htm.
70
In 1949 and 1978, only 7.3% and 17.9% of the total Chinese population lived in urban areas. By
2008, China's urbanization rate had reached 45.7%. Xiao-san Luo et al., Trace Metal Contamination in
Urban Soils of China, 421 SCI. OF THE TOTAL ENV’T 17, 18 (2011). Additionally, a draft of the country's
twelfth Five Year Plan aimed to raise the urbanization rate from 47.5 % in 2010 to 51.5% by the end of
2015, with an average annual increase of 4%. Li Jing, Soil Pollution Poisons More than Farmland, CHINA
DAILY (March 10, 2011), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/2011-03/10/content_12146168.htm.
71
WORLD BANK, OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT SITUATION ON BROWNFIELD REMEDIATION AND
REDEVELOPMENT IN CHINA (Sept. 2010).
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urban environments while other factories are pushed out of the city
entirely. 72 Out of necessity, former industrial zones are re-classified for
residential use.73 Between 2001 and 2009, at least 98,000 industrial plants
were closed and relocated across the country. 74 Many of the industrial
plants were state-owned factories with high pollution output were built
during the Great Leap Forward. 75 In normal circumstances, real estate
developers would covet these centrally located pieces of property.76 Yet, the
sites have become empty brownfields.77 They have become a roadblock to
development, both because of pollution problems and because property
owners and developers are concerned they may be held liable for the health
effects of that pollution if they develop the land.78
Although Chinese law requires that soil be analyzed for contaminates
before large construction projects commence,79 this requirement is generally
ignored. For example, in 2006, a housing developer in the city of Wuhan
was awarded the contract to build near the city.80 A year into construction,
the site was determined to be the former location of a fertilizer factory and
the soil to have been heavily contaminated.81 The developer demanded his
money back and the city of Wuhan paid RMB 120 million in compensation.
Remediation, costing RMB 232 million, started in 2011.82
Soil pollution does not merely slow the economic development in
China’s urban environments—it also slows rural Chinese economies by
contaminating the food supply. Due to topsoil pollution, China is suffering
from economic losses in the form of reduced farmland production.83 It is

72

Id.
Yin Pumin, Healing the Land, BEIJING REVIEW (May 7, 2012),
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/Energy/txt/2012-05/07/content_453010.htm.
74
Id. In Beijing, more than 200 polluting enterprises inside the Fourth Ring Road have been
relocated, leaving nearly eight million square miles of industrial land to be redeveloped. See WORLD BANK,
supra note 71, at 4.
75
See WORLD BANK, supra note 71, at 4.
76
See generally Kenneth Rapoza, China’s Housing Market Continues to Soar, FORBES (Sept. 18,
2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2013/09/18/chinas-housing-market-continues-to-soar/.
77
A brownfield is “any land or premise which has been previously developed and is not currently
fully in use, although it may be partially occupied or utilized. It may also be vacant, derelict, or
contaminated.” Sandra Alker et al., The Definition of Brownfield, J. OF ENVTL. PLAN MGM’T, 64, 64-69
(2000).
78
See generally WORLD BANK, supra note 71, at 4-6.
79
Wang Canfa, Chinese Environmental Law Enforcement: Current Deficiencies and Suggested
Reforms, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 161, 166 (2007).
80
Bao Xiaodong & Zhang Xinyuan, supra note 38.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Li Jing, supra note 70.
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estimated that in China twelve million tons of grain are contaminated by
heavy metals each year, causing a loss of RMB 20 billion.84
China is particularly vulnerable to food shortages. China must feed
22% of the world’s population on less than 9% of the world’s cultivated
land, and that area of land is shrinking. 85 Poorer counties in China are
particularly vulnerable, as food availability is largely determined by local
food supply.86 Food prices are extremely volatile. For example, prices rose
18% between 2008 and 2009.87 Rising food prices have the attention of the
central government. In 2011, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao pledged to boost
food supplies to hold down costs.88 China cannot afford to lose significant
portions of its domestic crops. A strong policy that ensures polluted soil is
properly remediated will make more land available for development in urban
areas and help stabilize China’s food security.
C.

Mass Protests Against Soil Pollution Threaten China’s Social Stability

In addition to causing environmental and economic problems, soil
pollution is also a source of civil unrest. Less than 1% of environmental
disputes are resolved through legal channels.89 Chinese affected by severe
environmental pollution have increasingly taken to protesting, which poses a
threat to social stability. 90 While environmental protests are a relatively
84
Xu Qi, Facing up to “Invisible Pollution,” CHINA ENVTL. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2006),
http://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/724-Facing-up-to-invisible-pollution-.
85
Jie Chen, supra note 43, at 2. For example, China faces tightening grain supplies. See Grain
Supply Concern Amid Fast Urbanization, CHINA DAILY (Jan. 15, 2013),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-01/15/content_16121993.htm.
86
XIAO YUNLAI & NIE FENGYING, WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME, A REPORT ON THE STATUS OF
CHINA’S FOOD SECURITY 36, (2009) http://www.wfp.org/content/china-report-status-food-security-2009.
87
Experts Warn Inflation Could Lead to Unrest, VOICE OF AMERICA (Oct. 27, 2009),
http://www.voanews.com/content/a-13-2008-02-22-voa13-66807847/255756.html. Inflation was the top
social concern among Chinese citizens in 2010. Tom Orlick, Unrest Grows as Economy Booms, WALL ST.
J. (Sept. 26, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903703604576587070600504108.html.
88
Bruce Grant, Wen Vows to Control Chinese Food, Home Prices as Police Head Off Protests,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Feb. 27, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-27/wen-vows-to-controlchinese-food-home-prices-as-police-head-off-protests.html. For an example of rising food prices leading to
protests, see Pinghui Zhuang, Pupils Protest Over Food Price Rises, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Jul. 19,
2012), http://www.scmp.com/article/731650/pupils-protest-over-food-price-rises.
89
Feng Jie & Wang Tao, Officials Struggling to Respond to the Year of Environmental Protests,
SOUTHERN WEEKEND (China) (June 12, 2012), https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/5438Officials-struggling-to-respond-to-China-s-year-of-environment-protests-.
90
See Elaine Kurtenbach, Jinko Solar Holding Company Pledges Toxic Waste Cleanup In China,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 20, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/20/jinko-solar-holdingcompany-toxic-waste-cleanup_n_971419.html; Tania Branigan, Anti-Pollution Protesters Halt
Construction of Copper Plant in China, THE GUARDIAN (July 3, 2012),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jul/03/china-anti-pollution-protest-copper.
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recent phenomenon,91 the number of incidents is rising quickly. In 2005,
over 50,000 protests occurred due to pollution.92 Since 1996, the number of
environmental protests in China has grown 29% per year.93
The environmental protests in China are largely grass-roots responses
to specific environmental threats.94 Generally, national environmental nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”) are not involved in these localized
protests.95 Chinese protest both in response to environmental incidents that
have already occurred, as when villagers in Shaanxi Province tore down a
fence and smashed trucks upon learning that lead pollution from a local
plant had poisoned more than 600 children. 96 They also protest in
anticipation of future environmental degradation, as when thousands of
Chinese in Sichuan Province protested the construction of a molybdenum
copper plant.97 Because the protests are always in response to specific local
issues, they generally end once the specific problem has been addressed.98
For example, an environmental protest ended once the polluting facility in
Shaanxi was closed, 99 and the government promised to pay for victims’
treatment.100 In Sichuan, protests caused plans to build the copper plant to
be abandoned.101 In general, once the government takes action, protests stop
and do not grow into larger movements.102
91

See Feng Jie & Wang Tao, supra note 89.
Li Fangchao, Environment Issus Addressed More Urgently, CHINA DAILY (May 4, 2006),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2006-05/04/content_582631.htm (quoting Pan Yue, deputy director
of the State Environmental Protection Administration) ; Oster, supra note 1.
93
Feng Jie & Wang Tao, supra note 89. This figure came from Yang Zhaofei, vice-chair of the
Chinese Society for Environmental Sciences, at a speech to a recent special meeting of the Standing
Committee of the eleventhNational People’s Congress.
94
Tong Yanqi distinguishes the grass roots protests of a pollution driven model of environmental
social movements from the world view model. The world view model is largely found in countries that
have reached a level of affluence in which people have post-material values such as a quality of life, which
includes a clean environment in general. See Tong Yanqi, Environment Movements in Transitional
Societies, 37 COMP. POL. 167, 168-69 (2005).
95
An anonymous environmental NGO leader complained, “we already had too much trouble with
the government. If we get involved with these local protests, it will be difficult for us to define ourselves.
If we are perceived by the government as the black hand behind these protests, we won’t be able to survive.”
Id. at 181.
96
Jonathan Watts & Zhang Cui, Chinese Villagers Storm Factory Blamed for Lead Poisoning of 600
Children, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 17, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/aug/17/chinalead-factory-protest.
97
Branigan, supra note 90.
98
Tong Yanqi, supra note 94, at 183.
99
Smelter to Close Fully After Poisoning 851 Children With Lead, XINHUA (Aug. 19, 2009),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-08/19/content_11911834.htm.
100
Watts & Zhang Cui, supra note 96.
101
Branigan, supra note 90.
102
Phillip Stalley & Donging Yang, An Emerging Environmental Movement in China?, 186 THE
CHINA Q. 333, 335-36 (2006).
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The Chinese government is very concerned about any form of social
unrest. The Chinese Communist Party has endorsed the doctrine of the
“harmonious society” in response to growing inequalities in Chinese
society.103 The policy aims for a well-off, middle class society with minimal
social tensions. 104 Feasibility reports for large construction projects now
include “stability assessments” to assess the project’s risk to social
stability.105 However, the government’s response to social unrest is often
heavy handed. In the environmental protests in Zhejiang Province,
protestors were beaten 106 and imprisoned. 107 Local authorities used
intimidation and close surveillance to control the area.108 These practices are
typical of the government’s wei wen strategy of stopping large-scale
demonstrations by any means necessary, including force.109 If force fails,
the government will quickly make concessions to keep the movement from
escalating.110
Given the severity of China’s pollution problems, the local-level
environmental protests will not abate anytime soon. Moreover, Chinese
attitudes towards pollution are changing. A recent survey shows that 57% of
Chinese prioritize protecting the environment, even at the risk of curbing
economic growth.111 Without reform, environment pollution will continue to
threaten the government’s goal of social stability.

103
Joseph Kahn, China Makes Commitment to Social Harmony, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/12/world/asia/12china.html?_r=0.
104
See the People’s Daily definition of “harmonious society,” at:
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90002/92169/92211/6274603.html. The People’s Daily is an organ of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party. See China Defies Media Cuts and Closures with New
Newspaper Launch, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 20, 2009),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/apr/20/china-newspaper-launch.
105
Feng Jie & Wang Tao, supra note 89.
106
Large Scale Riot Erupts in Huashui Town of Zhejiang Province, THE EPOCH TIMES (Apr. 15,
2005), http://www.theepochtimes.com/news/5-4-15/27880.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2013).
107
Mark Magnier, As China Spews Pollution, Villagers Rise Up, LA TIMES (Sept. 3, 2006),
http://articles.latimes.com/2006/sep/03/world/fg-enviro3.
108
Id.
109
See Harold Thibault, Environmental Activism Gains Foothold in China, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 21,
2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/aug/21/environment-activists-china-pollution-protest
(commentary of sociologist Yang Guobin).
110
Id.
111
Daniella Yu & Anita Pugliese, Majority of Chinese Prioritize Environment Over Economy,
GALLUP (June 8, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/155102/majority-chinese-prioritize-environmenteconomy.aspx. Compare with Stalley & Donging Yang, supra note 102 (explaining that protests in China
usually stop once the government intervenes).
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CHINA’S SOIL POLLUTION LAWS ARE VAGUE AND INEFFECTIVE; OTHER
SOURCES OF LAW FAIL TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEMS OF SOIL
POLLUTION

Despite the soil pollution problems outlined above and constitutional
commitments to environmental protection,112 China lacks effective laws on
comprehensive soil remediation. 113 In lieu of a law that directly addresses
soil pollution, existing soil pollution may trigger several discrete, national
tort and criminal laws, none of which ensure soil pollution is properly
remediated. China’s environmental laws fail to prevent soil contamination
and, when contamination occurs, fail to require remediation because the
laws are ambiguous, fines are ineffective, and local governments have no
incentive to enforce the laws. Other areas of the law that may be used to
address soil pollution, such as tort and criminal law, are also ineffective. Tort
law fails because it is extremely difficult for a private citizen to bring suit;
criminal laws addressing soil pollution are rarely invoked.
A.

National Environmental Law Principles Have Not Been Transformed
Into Regulations

China lacks a national law making soil pollution remediation
compulsory and lacks national standards for surveying and assessing risk of
polluted sites. 114 However, two national laws do make reference to
contaminated sites and put forth guiding principles of regulation: The Law
of the People’s Republic of China on Prevention and Control of
Environmental Pollution by Solid Waste (“Solid Waste Law”) and the
Environmental Protection Law of People’s Republic of China
(“Environmental Protection Law”).115 While these two laws provide guiding
principles for soil remediation, the laws are ineffective because the
principles have not been made into substantive regulations.
The Solid Waste Law and the Environmental Protection Law contain
provisions for the treatment of contaminants.
Under the law, the
112
In broad terms, the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China provides that the state is
responsible for protecting the environment and preventing the spread of pollution. See XIANFA art. 26
(1982) (“The state protects and improves the living environment and the ecological environment, and
prevents and controls pollution and other public hazards.”).
113
Wang Jin & Yan Houfu, supra note 22, at 496.
114
Bao Xiaodong & Zhang Xinyuan, supra note 38.
115
See MCELWEE, supra note 28. In China’s hierarchy of laws, “basic law” enacted by the National
People’s Congress is at the top. Both of these laws were enacted by the Standing Committee of the
National People’s Congress and are thus not basic laws. No environmental law has been enacted by the full
National People’s Congress.
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environmental protection departments may order facilities that have failed to
treat hazardous waste to begin treating waste in accordance with relevant
provisions within a specified period of time.116 If an entity fails to do so, it
may be required to have a third party treat the hazardous waste at the entity’s
expense.117 Moreover, entities that cause severe environmental pollution are
required to take measures to eliminate or reduce the danger of the pollution,
promptly inform anyone that may be harmed, and report the pollution to the
environmental protection department of the local people's government at or
above the county level and other relevant departments. 118 A polluting
enterprise is obligated to eliminate the hazard and compensate victims for
direct losses.119
Both laws obligate the government to remedy soil pollution. Under
the Solid Waste Law, the government must take measures to eliminate or
reduce the danger when severe environmental pollution threatens the lives
and property of people. If necessary, the government may stop operations
that have caused or may cause pollution accidents. 120 Under the
Environmental Protection Law, if life or property is endangered by severe
environmental pollution, the department of environmental protection must
report to the local people’s government, and the government remove or
alleviate the hazard.121
While seemingly well-intentioned, the laws are more akin to policy
statements than substantive legal requirements. 122 For example, for the
116

Yufang He Kongzhi Guti Feiwu Wuran Huanjin (固体废物污染环境防治法) [The Prevention
and Control of Environmental Pollution by Solid Waste Law of the People’s Republic of China]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Congress, Oct. 30, 1995, effective Apr. 1,
2005), art. 55 (China).
117
Id.
118
Id. at art. 63. The Environmental Protection Law contains a similar provision, but appears to have
a lower threshold, applying to mere accidents of pollution, stating: “[a]ny unit that, as a result of an
accident or any other exigency, has caused or threatens to cause an accident of pollution, must promptly
take measures to prevent and control the pollution hazards, make the situation known to such units and
inhabitants as are likely to be endangered by such hazards.” Id. at art. 31.
119
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Huanjing Baohu Fa (中华人民共和国环境保护法)
[Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong, Dec. 26, 1989, effective Dec. 26, 1989), art. 41 (China).
120
Yufang He Kongzhi Guti Feiwu Wuran Huanjin (固体废物污染环境防治法) [The Prevention
and Control of Environmental Pollution by Solid Waste Law of the People’s Republic of China]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Congress, Oct. 30, 1995, effective Apr. 1,
2005), art. 64 (China).
121
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Huanjing Baohu Fa (中华人民共和国环境保护法)
[Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong, Dec. 26, 1989, effective Dec. 26, 1989), art. 32 (China).
122
Wang, supra note 12, at 203. For example, the Solid Waste Law provides that the State shall:
encourage and support the adoption of beneficial measures of centralized treatment of solid wastes,
encourage and support scientific research, encourage the entities and individuals to purchase and use
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treatment of hazardous waste, the “relevant provisions” and “specified
periods of time” of Article 55 of the Solid Waste Law are never defined.123
Similarly, the measures the government is required to take to remove or
alleviate hazards under Article 32 of the Environmental Protection Law are
never specified.
Normally, the State Council and the MEP would implement
regulations to enforce these principles, 124 but no regulations have been
implemented.125 When legislation requires, as it does here, the State Council
is authorized to promulgate administrative regulations. 126 Relevant State
Council agencies create regulations pursuant to the national law.127 These
regulations have the force of law. 128 The MEP has adopted a single
“directive” specifically for soil remediation.129 The Directive on Completing
Environmental Pollution Prevention and Control When Enterprises Move,
states that "the company which inherits the debts and rights (of the polluter)
should shoulder the responsibility for providing financial assistance to
restore the productivity of polluted land."130 However, the directive fails to
clarify the punishment for violators 131 and has remained largely
ineffective. 132 The ambiguities are the result of compromises made in
renewable products and reusable products, encourage scientific research and production institutions to do
research on and manufacture plastic-sheet covering and packages of commodities, and encourage a legal
service agency to offer legal aids to the victims of suits of environmental pollution by solid wastes. Yufang
He Kongzhi Guti Feiwu Wuran Huanjin (固体废物污染环境防治法) [The Prevention and Control of
Environmental Pollution by Solid Waste Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Congress, Oct. 30, 1995, effective Apr. 1, 2005), art. 3, 6, 7, 17, and
84 (China).
123

See Yufang He Kongzhi Guti Feiwu Wuran Huanjin (固体废物污染环境防治法) [The
Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollution by Solid Waste Law of the People’s Republic of China]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Congress, Oct. 30, 1995, effective Apr. 1,
2005), art. 55 (China).
124
MCELWEE, supra note 28, at 83.
125
INGA CALDWELL & XINYU WANG, VERMONT LAW SCHOOL, A HIDDEN PROBLEM: CHINA’S
CONTAMINATED SITE SOIL POLLUTION CRISIS 4 (2011),
http://www.vermontlaw.edu/Documents/China%20Program/CaldwellWangPaper3.pdf.
126
Per XIANFA art. 89(1), the State Council has the power to “adopt administrative measures, enact
administrative rules and regulations, and issue decisions and orders in accordance with the Constitution and
statutes.” Some scholars posit that this power makes the State Council the most important organ of state
power. As most national legislation is extremely general, the State Council has the ability to essentially rewrite the laws. MCELWEE, supra note 28.
127
MCELWEE, supra note 28, at 78.
128
MA XIAOYANG & LEONARDO ORTOLANO, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN CHINA: INSTITUTIONS,
ENFORCEMENT, AND COMPLIANCE 15 (2000).
129
Caldwell & Xinyu Wang, supra note 125, at 14.
130
Wu Jiao, Govt Targets Land Pollution to Ensure Food Security, CHINA DAILY (June 20, 2008),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-06/20/content_6779537.htm.
131
See id.
132
It is not uncommon for agencies responsible for drafting environmental assessments of
construction projects to falsify their reports in order to benefit the future polluter. Wang Canfa, supra note
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drafting and concerns over economic growth.133 Many counties and towns
continue to dispose of waste without any treatment.134
B.

China’s Environmental Laws are Largely Enforced by Local Agencies,
Which are Controlled by Local Governments and Prevented from
Effectively Enforcing Environmental Regulations

Ambiguities in the national law contribute to the failure of the law in a
formalistic sense, but enforcement of the law brings an additional set of
problems. The MEP is part of the central government’s State Council and is
replicated as Environmental Protection Bureaus (“EPBs”) at each
subsequent lower level of local government—provincial, city, district,
county, and town. 135 Local EPBs are agencies in the local government;
EPBs are not part of the central government. Local EPBs are charged with
actually implementing the MEP’s regulations,136 but they serve competing
masters. The MEP and provincial level EPBs promulgate regulations and
policies for local EPBs. 137 However, in all cases, the local government
appoints the local EPB’s director 138 and provides their annual budget. 139
Because local governments control each local EPB’s budgets, local
governments are the more powerful interest.140
Many officials in local governments are more concerned with GDP
than the environment, both in order to raise sufficient revenue for their
government and out of self-interest. China divides revenue and expenditures
among central and local governments.141 The central government collects a
79, at 166-67. Professor Wang cites one example in which the EIA report stated the distance between the
proposed plant and a residential district was 400 meters, when it was actually 20 meters.
133
Wang, supra note 12, at 204 (reporting that Zou Shengxian, director of the State Environmental
Protection Administration, said “[l]ocal protectionism has resulted in rampant violation of the
environment.”).
134
Wang Canfa, supra note 79, at 170.
135
See Abigail Jahiel, The Organization of Environmental Protection in China, 156 THE CHINA Q.
757, 758-59 (Dec. 1998).
136
The MEP only exercises direct oversight in rare instances, such as large construction projects and
cross-provincial pollution prevention. See MCELWEE, supra note 28, at 113-18.
137
The hierarchy of political power is generally straightforward: a government office of lesser rank
has no authority to compel compliance from offices of higher rank. Thus, a provincial level EPB can make
demands on the city or county EPBs, but not vice versa. But sometimes, the hierarchy is unclear.
Provinces have the same rank as ministries. As such, the MEP, a ministry, cannot command a province to
comply with one of its regulations, it can only recommend that it comply. See Jahiel, supra note 135, at
765 n.18.
138
MCELWEE, supra note 28, at 115.
139
The local government also determines increases in personnel and even allocation of such resources
as cars, office buildings and employee housing. Jahiel, supra note 135, at 759.
140
Id.
141
Wang Jin & Yan Houfu, supra note 22, at 496.
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larger portion of the taxes, but local governments are primarily responsible
for public services.142 To improve public services under this scheme, local
officials must pursue policies that promote rapid economic growth.143 Many
environmental violators are major taxpayers supporting the local
government. 144 Large fines may also divert money from the local
community. 145 Reliant on the polluters’ contributions, local governments
instruct courts not to implement environmental penalties.146 In the Rongping
Factory case described in the introduction,147 the polluting chemical factory
accounted for 25% of the county’s income. 148 The factory’s arrival also
doubled the town’s population.149
Local officials also pursue economic development at the expense of
environmental considerations out of self-interest. Their job performance is
primarily evaluated on the growth of the local economy’s GDP. 150
Conversely, environmental performance constitutes only a small part of the
evaluation. 151 Party members are evaluated every five years, which
contributes to an emphasis on quick, short-term performance. 152 At best,
environmental performance does not affect the local economy. At worst, it
slows economic growth. Because of the importance of the GDP, local
governments tend to take short-term actions to quickly develop the
economy.153
C.

Fines Levied by Local Environmental Departments are Ineffective
Because Fines are Rarely Awarded and Often the Cost of the Fine is
Lower than the Cost of Compliance

The environmental protection department of local governments may
levy fines against polluting entities. Fines can result from a number of acts
and omissions. Entities can be fined for failing to declare solid wastes or
engaging in deception when declaring solid or hazardous waste.154 They can
142

Id.
Id.
144
Id. at 502 n.6.
145
Wang Canfa, supra note 79, at 169.
146
Wang Jin & Yan Houfu, supra note 22, at 499 n.6.
147
See supra Part I.
148
Wang Canfa, supra note 79, at 169.
149
Oster, supra note 1.
150
Wang Canfa, supra note 79, at 171.
151
Wang Jin & Yan Houfu, supra note 22, at 495-96.
152
See Gang Guo, China’s Local Political Budget Cycles, 53 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 621, 624 (2009).
153
Wang Canfa, supra note 79, at 171.
154
See Yufang He Kongzhi Guti Feiwu Wuran Huanjin (预防和控制固体废物污染环境) [The
Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollution by Solid Wastes Law of the People’s Republic of
143
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be fined for failing to adopt precautionary measures to prevent pollution by
hazardous waste. 155 Entities can be fined for closing, leaving idle, or
dismantling without permission equipment intended to prevent and control
solid or hazardous waste, 156 and for using sites or equipment previously
contaminated with hazardous waste without treatment.157
While the outward objective of fines is to discourage pollution, 158
fines are simply too low at present to deter environmental violations. Guilty
parties find it more cost-effective to pay the fine than correct violations.159
In theory, polluting facilities may be fined RMB 1,000,000 for dumping
imported waste from abroad160 and for severe environmental accidents.161 In
practice, fines do not exceed RMB 200,000.162 The cost of breaking the law
can be just 10% of the cost of compliance.163 While facilities that discharge
pollutants above proscribed standards should face administrative sanctions,
when the standards are enforced, the polluting facility is typically ordered to
reduce their discharge flow by a specified time rather than pay a fine.164
Instead of unilaterally levying fines against polluting facilities, local
environmental bureaus often negotiate with the polluting facility,165 settling
on a fine that is far below both the damages caused by the pollution and the
China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 2004, effective Apr. 1, 2005),
art. 68(1) & 75(1) (China); see also Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Huanjing Baohu Fa (中华人民共和国
环境保护法) [Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong, Dec. 26, 1989, effective Dec. 26, 1989), art. 35(2)-(3) (China).
155
Yufang He Kongzhi Guti Feiwu Wuran Huanjin (预防和控制固体废物污染环境) [The
Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollution by Solid Wastes Law of the People’s Republic of
China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 2004, effective Apr. 1, 2005),
art. 75(11) (China).
156
Id. at art. 68(4), 75(3).
157
Id. at art. 75(10).
158
See generally, Clifford Rechtschaffen, Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the Evolving Theory of
Environmental Enforcement, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1181 (1998).
159
Wang Jin & Yan Houfu, supra note 22, at 497.
160
Yufang He Kongzhi Guti Feiwu Wuran Huanjin (预防和控制固体废物污染环境) [The
Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollution by Solid Wastes Law of the People’s Republic of
China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 2004, effective Apr. 1, 2005),
art. 78 (China).
161
Id. at art. 82.
162
Michael Faure & Hao Zhang, Environmental Criminal law in China: A Critical Analysis, 41
ENVTL. LAW REP. 10,024, 10,037 (2011).
163
Dong Hongwei, Why Does Environmental Compliance Cost More than Penalty?—A legal
Analysis on Environmental Acts of Enterprises in China, 1 FRONTIER ENVTL. SCI. OF ENGINEERING 434,
435 (2007).
164
MCELWEE, supra note 28, at 54.
165
The local EPB has this power pursuant to the Environmental Protection Law. See Yufang He
Kongzhi Guti Feiwu Wuran Huanjin (固体废物污染环境防治法) [The Prevention and Control of
Environmental Pollution by Solid Waste Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Congress, Oct. 30, 1995, effective Apr. 1, 2005), art. 55 (China).
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expense of pollution control. 166 Not only is polluting often cheaper than
compliance, but polluting enterprises often view these fines as entitling them
to take unlawful action.167
Moreover, if the polluting entity refuses to pay a fine, environmental
departments are unable to take direct measures to compel payment and
instead must appeal to the courts for enforcement. 168 Unfortunately, the
courts do not cooperate with the enforcement of fines.169 In addition, the
environmental department is required to pay an initial “implementation fee”
to the courts.170 This fee is calculated by the amount of the penalty.171 Most
fees are very low, around RMB 50, and are not of interest to the courts.172
Administrative fines are the prevailing mechanism China uses to
punish those who violate environmental laws. 173 These fines are rarely
enforced and ineffective when enforced. Unfortunately, there is little
government initiative to change this faulty scheme.174
D.

Polluters May be Civilly Liable but it is Extremely Difficult for
Citizens to Bring Cases

Civil suits, in which private citizens attempt to enforce environmental
laws through litigation, are another means of forcing polluting entities to
remediate polluted soil and prevent soil pollution in general. Two national
laws provide a cause of action for environmental tort litigation. The
166
Stefanie Beyer, Environmental Law and Policy in the People’s Republic of China, 5(1) CHINESE
J. OF INT’L L., 185, 207 (2006).
167
Id. at 207-08. For a striking account of a polluting enterprise paying compensation to a village to
continue to pollute, with no intent of remediation, see Anna Lora-Wainwright, et. al., Learning to Live with
Pollution: The Making of Environmental Subjects in a Chinese Industrialized Village, 68 THE CHINA J. 106,
106-24 (2012).
168
Zhōnghuá rénmín gònghéguó xíngzhèng sùsòng fǎ (中华人民共和国行政诉讼法)
[Administrative Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
of the Nat’l People’s Congress, April 4, 1989, effective Oct. 1, 1990), art. 66 (China). See also Alex Wang,
Environmental Courts and Public Interest Litigation in China, 43 CHINESE LAW AND GOV’T 4, 6 (2010);
Wang Jin & Yan Houfu, supra note 22, at 499.
169
Wang Jin & Yan Houfu, supra note 22, at 499.
170
Id. at 499, n.5.
171
The “implementation fee” is RMB 50 if the penalty is below RMB 10,000. If the penalty is more
than RMB 10,000 but less than RMB 500,000, the “implementation fee” will be 0.5% of that amount. If
the penalty is more than RMB 500,000, the “implementation fee” will be 0.1% of that amount. About 90%
of the environmental penalties in China are less than RMB 20,000. Id. at 500-01.
172
Id. at 499.
173
Administrative fines are more common than other civil or criminal penalties. Dong Hongwei,
supra note 163.
174
Wang Jin & Yan Houfu, supra note 22, at 497-98 (noting that while amending the Law on the
Prevention and Control of Water Pollution in 2007, many scholars supported the proposition to establish a
“daily penalty” in the law that would raise the cost of violations. However, the Legislature did not adopt
the penalty because doing so would increase the burden on enterprises and harm economic development.)
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Environmental Protection Law holds that “a unit that has caused an
environmental pollution hazard shall . . . make compensation to the unit or
individual that suffered direct losses.” 175 The Tort Law of the People’s
Republic of China (“Tort Law of China”) requires “where any harm is
caused by environmental pollution, the polluter shall assume the tort
liability.”176 On its face, the tort law appears favorable to pollution victims
because of the generous liability provisions and because the defendant
carries the burden of proof. In practice, courts frequently mis-apply the law,
victims are unaware of statute of limitations, local interests protect polluters,
and victims have difficulty enforcing judgments.
The tort law seems favorable to pollution victims because suspected
tort offenders in China are liable jointly and severally177 and China has “no
fault” liability for pollution violations.178 Under joint and several liability in
China, if two or more parties engage in conduct that hurts a third party, but
the third party is unable to establish which party is responsible for all the
specific damage, the victim can hold all the parties liable or instead choose
to hold only one party liable.179 This is important in scenarios where a new
enterprise has replaced an old enterprise, and it cannot be determined which
enterprise is primarily responsible for the soil pollution.180 Moreover, China
has “no fault” liability, meaning that pollution victims do not need to show
that the polluter violated a law or emission standards.181 Simply being in
175

Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Huanjing Baohu Fa (中华人民共和国环境保护法)
[Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong, Dec. 26, 1989, effective Dec. 26, 1989), art. 41 (China).
176
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qinquan Zeren Fa (中华人民共和国侵权责任法) [Tort Law of
the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 2009,
effective July 1, 2010), art. 65 (China), available at http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/200912/26/content_1497435.htm. English translation available at
http://www.procedurallaw.cn/english/law/201001/t20100110_300173.html.
177
Id. at art. 8.
178
Wang, supra note 12, at 208.
179
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qinquan Zeren Fa (中华人民共和国侵权责任法) [Tort Law of
the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 2009,
effective July 1, 2010), art. 8, 10, 68 (China), available at http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/200912/26/content_1497435.htm. English translation available at
http://www.procedurallaw.cn/english/law/201001/t20100110_300173.html.
180
See YUYONG GONG, THE WORLD BANK, INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE IN POLICY AND
REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS FOR BROWNFIELD SITE MANAGEMENT 3-4 (2010).
181
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Huanjing Baohu Fa (中华人民共和国环境保护法)
[Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong, Dec. 26, 1989, effective Dec. 26, 1989), art. 41 (China). Wang notes that the
language “in violation of state principles” under General Principles, art. 124, seems to indicate a
requirement for showing some violation of the law, but that scholars agree Environmental Protection Law
Article 41 controls because the specific supersedes the general, and the newer statute supersedes the older.
See Wang, supra note 12, at 208.
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compliance with the law is not enough to shield pollution producing
enterprises from civil liability.
Pollution victims also have an advantage because the burden of proof
lies with the polluting defendant.182 The polluting entity assumes the burden
to prove that it is not liable, its liability could be mitigated, or that there is no
causation between its conduct and the harm.183 The Supreme People’s Court
has confirmed that the burden of proof lies with the defendant.184 Despite
the Supreme People’s Court’s position, many courts still require the
pollution victims to show causation, 185 or require the victims to show
causation before shifting the burden to the defendant.186
While the liability and burden of proof provisions favor pollution
victims, it is nevertheless extremely difficult for pollution victims to win in
tort litigation. Petitioners must file their claim within three years of
becoming aware of pollution related loses.187 Yet in many cases, pollution
victims’ first instinct is not to file a suit but to bring the problem to the
attention of local government authorities.188 Polluting enterprises engage in
stalling tactics, by which the enterprise enters into negotiations with the

182
Yufang He Kongzhi Guti Feiwu Wuran Huanjin (预防和控制固体废物污染环境) [The
Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollution by Solid Wastes Law of the People’s Republic of
China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 2004, effective Apr. 1, 2005),
art. 86 (China); Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qinquan Zeren Fa (中华人民共和国侵权责任法) [Tort
Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec.
26, 2009, effective July 1, 2010), art. 66 (China), available at http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/200912/26/content_1497435.htm. English translation available at
http://www.procedurallaw.cn/english/law/201001/t20100110_300173.html.
183
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qinquan Zeren Fa (中华人民共和国侵权责任法) [Tort Law of
the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 2009,
effective July 1, 2010), art. 66 (China), available at http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/200912/26/content_1497435.htm. English translation available at
http://www.procedurallaw.cn/english/law/201001/t20100110_300173.html.
184
See MCELWEE, supra note 28, at 256. In Hebei, a Korean manufacturer was held liable for the
death of a neighbor because the manufacturer could not prove it was not the cause of the fatal cancer.
Though the court appeared to award reduced damages because no causal connection between the pollution
and the cancer was shown, this remains an area of potential concern for companies operating in China. See
id. at 255-56 (citing Qie Jianrong, Pollution Victim Li Yujun Prevails in Claim for Cancer Death, LEGAL
DAILY, (July 7, 2009), http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/bm/2009-07/08/content_1119585.htm).
185
Wang, supra note 12, at 209.
186
Adam Moser & Tseming Yang, Environmental Tort Litigation in China, 41 ENVTL. LAW REP.
10895, 10897 (2011).
187
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Huanjing Baohu Fa (中华人民共和国环境保护法)
[Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong, Dec. 26, 1989), art. 42 (China).
188
Benjamin van Rooij, People vs. Pollution: Understanding Citizen Action Against Pollution in
China, 19 J. OF CONTEMP. CHINA 55, 63 (2010).
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citizens 189 with no intent of executing the agreement and subsequently
forcing the citizens to pursue an alternative course of action.190
To bring suit, plaintiffs must pay the court an “acceptance fee,” which
is a percentage of relief requested.191 The fees can be low, RMB 50 for
cases involving less than RMB 10,000, but fees quickly escalate if more
relief is requested.192 These acceptance fees act as a deterrent on citizens
trying to bring suit. 193 Indigent plaintiffs can seek a waiver for the
acceptance fee, but waiving the fee is at the court’s discretion. Some courts
rely on fees to support their operational budget,194 and some courts deny
waivers to a plaintiff that the court believes is a “troublemaker.”195
Once in court, plaintiffs are not required by law to show causation, but
they must show damages. 196 In many instances, damage claims require
technical expertise that plaintiffs simply do not have; thus, the plaintiffs
must bring in outside experts. 197 It can be very difficult for plaintiffs to
show damages from one-time pollution violations, because at the time of the
violation a victim may not have anticipated needing evidence of damages for
a later court case.198 In addition, judges rarely have environmental expertise
and have difficulty weighing different expert opinions to find a resolution.199
The same local protectionist interests that affect agency enforcement
of environmental laws are also at play in the courtroom. 200 Local
governments control judicial appointments and finance local courts. 201 In
deciding civil lawsuits, local courts often take “overall interests” into
consideration. 202 These “overall interests” are all the potential at-large
interests that may be affected by the decision, not just the interests of the
189

These negotiations may be moderated by the local EPB, and the bureaus may help determine who
is liable. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Huanjing Baohu Fa (中华人民共和国环境保护法)
[Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong, Dec. 26, 1989, effective Dec. 26, 1989), art. 41 (China). Administrative mediations
settle the majority of pollution claims in China, and each EPB may have its own procedures. MCELWEE
supra note 28, at 254.
190
van Rooij, supra note 188, at 74.
191
Wang, supra note 12, at 211.
192
The acceptance fees can range from 0.5 % of requested compensation for requested compensation
of over RMB 200 million, to 2.5% for requested compensation between RMB 10,000 and 1 million.
Rachel Stern, From Dispute to Decision: Suing Polluters in China, 206 THE CHINA Q. 294, 300 (2011).
193
Moser & Tseming Yang, supra note 186, at 10897.
194
Id.
195
Stern, supra note 192, at 300.
196
Moser & Tseming Yang, supra note 186, at 10898.
197
Id. at 10899.
198
van Rooij, supra note 188, at 68.
199
Moser & Tseming Yang, supra note 186, at 10989.
200
See supra Part III.B.
201
Cai Dingjian, Development of Chinese Legal, 11 CULTURAL DYNAMICS 135, 161 (1999).
202
Moser & Tseming Yang, supra note 186, at 10896.
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parties to the dispute.203 Often consideration of the “overall interests” means
a focus on protecting social stability, which entails preserving the status
quo 204 and not creating or setting a new precedent for environmental
remediation.205
Even when plaintiffs succeed at trial, it is often difficult to enforce
compliance with the decision. Although the Environmental Protection Law
states that a polluting unit “shall have the obligation to eliminate” the
pollution hazard,206 indicating courts could require soil remediation, courts
rarely do so, instead opting for monetary compensation.207 Yet enforcing
monetary judgments is difficult. Officials may respond to requests for
enforcement of non-local judgments by ignoring the law or inventing
expenses to deduct a percentage from the award. 208 Officials may also
conspire with the local government to hide assets. 209 Additionally, some
courts only assist in the enforcement of judgments from jurisdictions in
which their own decisions are enforced.210
Environmental tort litigation is increasingly popular as a potential
source of relief for the victims of environmental pollution,211 and there have
been some recent successful cases brought by private citizens against
polluting industries.212 Nevertheless, institutional barriers to bringing and
successfully executing an environmental tort claim are such that
environmental torts do not sufficiently deter soil polluters. Consequently,
environmental tort litigation is not a viable alternative to a national soil
remediation policy.

203

Id.
Id.
For a description of the mechanisms at play that discourage judges from making waves, including
liability for legal error, see generally Carl Minzer, Judicial Disciplinary Systems for Incorrectly Decided
Cases: The Imperial Chinese Heritage Lives On, 39 N.M. L. REV. 63 (2009).
206
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Huanjing Baohu Fa (中华人民共和国环境保护法)
[Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong, Dec. 26, 1989, effective Dec. 26, 1989).
207
Moser & Tseming Yang, supra note 186, at 10897. For an example of the difficulties of
compliance in general, even with the support of local officials, consider the incident in Yangzhoug City,
Hunan Province. Local officials, including delegates of the local National People’s Congress, stormed a
smelter that had refused to stop production and destroyed the plant’s furnaces with three tons of dynamite.
See Ouyang Hongliang & Zhang Ruidan, Heavy Metal Warfare, CAIJING (Aug. 11, 2011),
http://english.caijing.com.cn/2009-08-11/110222718.html.
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Cai Dingjian, supra note 201, at 146-50.
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Id.
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Id. at 150.
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In 2006, there were 616,122 environmental complaints, a 60% increase from 2001. See Stern,
supra note 192, at 295.
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See supra Part I.
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Polluters May be Held Criminally Liable, but Liability is Generally
Reserved for Well-Publicized Cases

The Solid Waste Law, 213 Environmental Protection Law, 214 and
Criminal Law215 all contain criminal liability provisions for environmental
abuses. Yet the language of the laws is too ambiguous and penalties are too
infrequently enforced for the laws to be effective deterrents.
The Solid Waste Law and the Environmental Protection Law do not
define environmental crimes or contain specific sanctions. 216 The Solid
Waste Law states that if the act constitutes a crime, the perpetrator shall be
subject to criminal liability.217 The Environmental Protection Law states that
if a violation of law causes a serious environmental pollution accident,
leading to heavy losses of property, human injury, or death, then the person
directly responsible shall be investigated for criminal responsibility.218 The
party held responsible is not usually the director of the polluting enterprise,
but rather a lower level employee.219
The Criminal Law sets out a maximum prison sentence of seven
years.220 The requisite “serious consequences” for environmental pollution
accidents is a relatively low threshold.221 Traditionally, criminal sanctions in
213
Yufang He Kongzhi Guti Feiwu Wuran Huanjin (预防和控制固体废物污染环境) [The
Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollution by Solid Wastes Law of the People’s Republic of
China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 2004, effective Apr. 1, 2005)
(China).
214
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Huanjing Baohu Fa (中华人民共和国环境保护法)
[Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 1989, effective Dec. 26, 1989) (China).
215
Zhōngguó rénmín gònghéguó xíngfǎ (中国人民共和国刑法) [Criminal Law of the People’s
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Cong., July 1, 1979,
effective March 14, 1997), art. 338.
216
MCELWEE, supra note 28, at 248.
217
Yufang He Kongzhi Guti Feiwu Wuran Huanjin (预防和控制固体废物污染环境) [The
Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollution by Solid Wastes Law of the People’s Republic of
China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 2004, effective Apr. 1, 2005),
art. 78, 83 (China) (governing dumping, piling up, treating, and importing solid waste from abroad and the
collection, storage, utilization, or treatment of hazardous waste).
218
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Huanjing Baohu Fa (中华人民共和国环境保护法)
[Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong, Dec. 26, 1989, effective Dec. 26, 1989), art. 49 (China).
219
For lack of Chinese criminal sanctions for executives and managers, see Jeffrey M. Bellamy,
Putting the Boss Behind Bars: Using Criminal Sanctions Against Executives Who Pollute – What China
Could Learn From the United States, 13 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 579 (2002).
220
Zhōngguó rénmín gònghéguó xíngfǎ (中国人民共和国刑法) [Criminal Law of the People’s
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Cong., July 1, 1979,
effective March 14, 1997), art. 338.
221
MCELWEE , supra note 28, at 250. See also Zui Gao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Huajing
Wuran Zingshi Anjian Juti Zingyong Falu Ruogan Wenti De Jieshi (最高人民法院审理环境污染刑事案
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the environmental context are reserved for large, well-publicized incidents
and are not imposed in less-publicized incidents.222 Even when pollution
qualifies as a crime, violators are more likely to receive administrative
penalties in the form of fines223 than criminal punishment.224 Between 1997
and 2003, of the 387 pollution accidents that would have constituted a crime,
only 20 involved criminal prosecutions.225 The problem seems to be a lack
of will.
Because of the inadequacy of environmental criminal law, prosecutors
may choose to pursue different tactics for extreme cases. The Biaoxin
Chemical Company was held responsible for illegally discharging toxic
chemicals that left one million people in Jiangsu Province without water.226
Biaoxin’s chairman was convicted of spreading poison in violation of
Criminal Law Article 115.227 Article 115 allows graver penalties, including
the death penalty.228 Though an interesting example of a unique strategy, it
is one that has not been frequently utilized. 229 Because criminal
prosecutions for environmental violations are rare, they do not deter crimes
against the environment.
IV.

THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD DEVELOP
REMEDIATION SCHEME

A

COMPREHENSIVE

As outlined above, China lacks a clear soil pollution remediation
policy. The government’s failure to address soil pollution has led to
environmental, economic, and social problems that will only worsen if the
problem is not addressed. Fortunately for China, it does not have to reinvent the wheel. China can draw on experiences of developed countries to
create an efficient and cost-effective solution. China’s central government
should consider the problems that other countries’ soil remediation programs
faced in order to anticipate likely problems in its own program. Of course, it
件的解释) [Supreme People’s Court Interpretation of the Trial of Criminal Cases of Environmental
Pollution] (promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct., effective July 28, 2006) (China). Serious consequences for
violating this law include property losses of at least RMB 300,000, death of one or more people, or light
wounds to not fewer than ten people.
222
MCELWEE, supra note 28, at 251.
223
For the failure of fines, see supra Part III.C.
224
Wang Canfa, supra note 79, at 168.
225
Id.; MCELWEE, supra note 28, at 251-52.
226
MCELWEE, supra note 28, at 252.
227
Id.
228
Zhōngguó rénmín gònghéguó xíngfǎ (中国人民共和国刑法) [Criminal Law of the People’s
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Cong., July 1, 1979,
effective March 14, 1997), art. 115.
229
MCELWEE, supra note 28, at 252.
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would be unrealistic to expect policies directly transplanted from foreign
countries to work in China. Any remediation policy China adopts must
consider specific problems in China, particularly in the area of enforcement.
The central government should develop a remediation scheme that evaluates
the degree of remediation necessary, establishes channels for funding, offers
promotion targets to officials, and promotes public participation.
A.

A New Remediation Framework Should Include Standards of Risk
Assessment to Evaluate the Degree of Necessary Remediation

A policy requiring full soil remediation is not feasible in China.
Treating soil for pollutants is very expensive, especially if the goal is to
purify the soil entirely.230 This is an area where China can learn from the
mistakes of other countries. For example, in the United States, during the
early stages of the United States’ Superfund program, the small number of
initial soil remediation sites went over budget and cost the program large
amounts of money. 231 Similarly, the Netherlands’ initial soil remediation
program required all projects to be remediated to the same high standard, but
the program proved unsustainable due to the heavy expenses it incurred.232
Given the extent of China’s soil pollution problem, if China sets “complete
remediation” as its goal, the program would experience the same financial
setbacks experienced in the United States and the Netherlands. China can
also consider how other countries’ effectively addressed or resolved those
problems. The Netherlands adopted a successful risk-based approach to soil
remediation. 233 With the risk-based approach, the site’s future use is
considered to determine to what extent remediation is necessary. 234 The
Dutch system includes target values, the degree the soil should be free of
contaminants based on the anticipated use of the land, and intervention
values, which are based on the current risk-level the soil pollution carries.235
For example, sites in urban areas that will eventually support residential or
commercial buildings receive more extensive remediation, whereas rural
sites receive less remediation.

230

YUYANG GONG, supra note 180, at 5.
Id.; Mark Jaffe, Superfund Cleanup Becomes A Bureacratic Quagmire, PHILA. INQUIRER (Aug. 17,
1986), http://articles.philly.com/1986-08-17/news/26066168_1_superfund-list-dangerous-toxic-waste-sitesepa-officials.
232
See WORLD BANK, supra note 71, at 31.
233
See generally Frank Swartjes, Risk-Based Assessment of Soil and Groundwater Quality in the
Netherlands: Standards and Remediation Urgency, 19 RISK ANALYSIS 1235 (1999).
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YUYANG GONG, supra note 180, at 35.
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See id.
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Contaminated soil lies within China’s urban and rural areas. 236
Instead of implementing a program that requires the same remediation
standards regardless of how the land will be used, China should develop a
policy that involves a risk-based analysis. A risk-based system can reduce
the cost and time of remediation.
B.

A New Remediation Framework Should Include Targets for
Government Officials to Ensure the Policy is Implemented

Environmental policy implementation is extremely difficult in China.
Much of the difficulty lies in the fact that implementation is left to the local
governments and the local governments are largely concerned with
developing the local economy.237 This is because their tax base is supported
by the local economy and because the officials are evaluated for promotion
based on economic performance.238
One way to encourage local government officials to comply with
proposed regulations is to provide relevant environmental “targets” on which
the local cadre’s promotions are evaluated. 239 The Central Communist
Party’ (“CCP”) uses the cadre evaluation system to incentivize goals.240 The
most important goals gain “veto power,” in that the failure to achieve them
trumps all other accomplishments. 241 The cadre system also provides
horizontal oversight in that officials can be held collectively liable for the
performance of any individual on the same level of government.242 This
creates a scenario in which officials at the same level monitor each other’s
work to ensure the legislation is being implemented.243 In practice, the cadre
evaluation system has been successful in implementing policies. For
example, China’s one-child policy has been implemented effectively because
the policy’s goals have “veto power.”244
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See supra Part II.A.-B.
See supra Part X.
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See supra Part III.B.
239
Alex L. Wang, The Search for Sustainable Legitimacy, Environmental Law and Bureaucracy in
China, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 365 (2013); see also Wyatt Golding, Incentives for Change: China’s
Cadre System Applied to Water Quality, 20 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 399, 407 (2011) (explaining that the
cadre system considers environmental protection targets as part of performance evaluations).
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Susan H. Whiting, The Cadre Evaluation System at the Grass Roots: The Paradox of Party Rule,
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(Barry J. Naughton & Dali L. Yang, eds., 2004).
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Including “veto power” targets in a soil remediation policy will ensure
that local officials do no simply ignore the soil remediation policy. Instead of
pressuring the EPBs to turn a blind eye to local pollution, local officials will
assist the EPBs to enforce the policy. “Veto power” targets could remove the
biggest enemy of environmental law implementation: local officials.245
Initially, it may be a little strange to include mention of veto targets in
legislation because the cadre evaluation system relates to promotions within
the communist party, which is formally separate from the Chinese
government.246 Legislation usually does not mention the party explicitly.247
However, cadre evaluation targets have started to appear in environmental
legislation. For example, amendments to the Law on the Prevention and
Control of Water Pollution (Water Pollution Law) uses the cadre system to
incentivize local officials.248 Article 5 of the Water Pollution Law stipulates
that the fulfillment of water environmental protection targets constitutes a
part of the performance evaluation of local people's governments or their
responsible persons.249
However, including cadre evaluation targets in environmental policies
creates both problems if there are used to falsify information.250 Officials
will feel conflicting obligations: the obligation to maintain economic
growth and the obligation to enforce environmental laws that tend to slow
economic growth. Local officials may be tempted to falsify the data they
report back to their superiors.251 Data falsification has been a problem in the
past. A 2008 survey found that 81% of officials provided false data about
their village’s income.252
One solution to the problem of data falsification would be to allow the
national level MEP offices to conduct random inspections of areas that claim
to have met the soil remediation goals. This would provide a level of
national oversight. However, it would be difficult for this program to be
245
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The Chinese Communist Party has had a political monopoly since the founding of the People’s
Republic of China. See BEINA XU, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY,
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See Yufang He Kongzhi Guti Feiwu Wuran Huanjin (关于预防和控制的水环境污染的法律)
[The Prevention and Control of Water Pollution Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by
the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., May 11, 1984, amended 2008) (China).
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effective. China is a large country, 253 so a random sampling could only
cover a small amount of China’s soil. Moreover, officials have a time period
of four to five years to be promoted,254 so the MEP would have a four to five
year window to catch the falsified reports before the officials moved on. So
in addition to any national-wide sampling program, the remediation policy
should include channels for public participation and oversight, as explained
in the next section.
C.

A New Remediation Framework Should Include Channels for Public
Information and Participation

Any central government remediation policy should require local
governments to publicize initial soil pollution levels and soil pollution levels
after remediation is complete. Such a policy would have three benefits: it
would 1) apply additional pressure on the local officials to implement a soil
remediation policy, 2) inform citizens of their living environment, and 3)
allow citizens to oversee claims of successful remediation.
Including public participation creates additional pressure for
enforcement. As discussed, the Chinese public participates in environmental
issues even when uninvited.255 The internet and social media have created
new pathways for public participation. In response to illegal dumping in
Weifang, Shandong Province, activist Deng Fei has started a campaign on
the Twitter-like service, called “Weibo,” asking his followers to post pictures
of the rivers in their hometown. 256 Deng Fei has over three million
followers, some of whom responded by posting their own pictures or
accounts of pollution in their area.257 The government in Weifang quickly
responded to Deng Fei’s post, investigating over 700 factories and promising
RMB 100,000 to anyone that could find the culprit.258 The success of the
Weibo campaign demonstrates that public participation can ensure
accountability.
While it is important that public participation is encouraged, any new
soil pollution legislation should ensure that the public is informed.
253
See CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACT BOOK (China),
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Unfortunately, environmental protestors are not always informed and they
inadvertently act contrary to their interests.259 For example, there have been
instances in which protestors challenge new, efficient plants that are to
replace old, more polluting ones. For example, protests in Shifang and
Ningbo led to USD 64 million and USD 963 million losses in investments
respectively. 260 Scholars describe this as a “triple-lose” scenario: 1) the
local economy loses a sound and legitimate project; 2) the project approval
body loses public confidence; and 3) the public loses what may have been a
greener outcome.261 After the “successful” protests in Shifang, dozens of
small chemical plants scheduled for replacement continue polluting as
normal.262 Part of the problem is that the public often lacks confidence in
environmental regulation because so many environmental assessments are
misleading.263
Providing information about the soil pollution levels will help raise
awareness of the dangers of soil pollution and indicate that the central
government is serious about addressing the problem. With more awareness,
local citizens affected by soil pollution will draw the connection between
observed health problems and pollution in the soil. When government
officials claim successful remediation, the locals will be able to determine if
the remediation was actually performed. With successful remediation,
public confidence in the regulatory scheme will grow. If crops have not
returned and health has not improved, the citizens will have basis on which
to suspect the pollution has not been remediated. Citizens can then bring
claims of failure to implement remediation to the attention of higher
officials.264
V.

CONCLUSION

Soil pollution poses enormous problems for China’s economy,
national health, and social stability. In order to combat the problem of soil
pollution, the central government should enact comprehensive soil pollution
legislation that clarifies liability and sets a sliding scale of remediation
standards for polluted soil based on future land use. However, this is not to
259
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say enacting such legislation will ensure soil remediation success. Soil
pollution legislation should also include targets in cadre evaluation and
channels for public information and participation to systemically change the
way China addresses soil pollution.

